

An Evaluation of Success and Failures in Hambantota, Siribopura Resettlement Housing Program: Lessons Learned

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Abstract

Resettlement of displaced communities both developments induced and disaster induced has been a subject widely discussed for the last three decades. Among them this study reviews the experience of Siribopura resettlement housing program in Hambantota Sri Lanka, a city which has witnessed a number of evictions and resettlements during the past half a decade. Accordingly this article presents the findings of factors that contributed to the success and failures of the resettlement housing programs implemented in Hambantota during the period of 2004–2011. Autonomy of designing own houses, appropriate counseling and facilitating the resettlers to adapt to new environments, proper linkage of socio cultural aspects with real estate and economic aspects and availability of formal property rights are presented as crucial factors for the success of the resettlement in the case materials provided within this study. It is expected that the lessons learned from this research may provide a systematic feedback that can be utilized to increase effectiveness of planning and operation of resettlement programs in other emerging cities in Sri Lanka.

Keywords: Resettlement, Success and failure factors

Introduction

Around the world millions of people are being displaced due to various development projects, natural disasters etc (William, 1989). As stated by Kumarasiri (2009), during the last twenty years more than 20 million people worldwide have been compelled to move from their homes to make room for massive development projects. On the other hand, aftermath of lanina 2010, tsunami 2004 and 2011, millions of people have been displaced in countries like Australia, Pakistan, Brazil, Japan, Indonesia etc. including Sri Lanka. As a result “resettlement of these displaced communities” has been a subject widely discussed for the last three decades; centering around various impacts on re-settlers, with a particular focus on socio-economic hardships etc. As a matter of fact many studies of resettlement projects invariably highlight the sufferings of people that occur due to changes in their places of living and the livelihoods (Viratkapan *et.al* 2006). Although, from the perspective of displaced people, forced resettlement is always a disaster, the resettling agencies often assumed that the resettlement programs they design is often successful. Therefore it is important to reconcile these two extremes by learning from the past and correct the future, so as to minimize such negative effects being caused to the resettlers. Hence, this study aims to review the experiences of

“resettlement programs” in an emerging city like Hambantota, which has witnessed a number of evictions both development induced and disaster induced resettlements during the past half a decade. Accordingly this article presents the findings of a research study on the factors that contributed to the success and failures of the resettlement housing programs implemented in Hambantota during the period of 2004–2011. It is expected that the lessons learned from this research may provide a systematic feedback that can be utilized to increase effectiveness of planning and operation of resettlement programs in other emerging cities and towns in Sri Lanka.

Identifying Resettlements

Resettlement is a multisided opportunity for the reconstruction of systems of production and human settlements that represent a development in the standard of life of those affected, as well as in the regional economy of which they are a part. Therefore “resettlement”, must also be development oriented and planning must take into account that the social and physical infrastructure, school and health services, access to employment opportunities, and housing plot allotments and dwellings will meet expanded needs (Smith, 2001). And also as Macdonald *et al*, 2008 mentions; involuntary resettlement is commonly associated with the impoverishment of local communities, the destruction of their productive assets and the disruption of their social fabric. Such impoverishment risk may arise in terms of landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property and services and social disarticulation (Yuefang *et al*, 2003). Hence the primary objective of any induced involuntary resettlement process should be to prevent impoverishment and to reconstruct and improve the livelihood of resettlers. According to Asian Development Bank (1995) many development projects that require involuntary displacement of people generally have adverse economic, social, and environmental impacts on the displaced people. Hence three important elements should link with involuntary resettlement; compensation for lost assets and loss of livelihood and income, assistance for relocation including provision of relocation sites with appropriate facilities and services, and assistance for rehabilitation to achieve at least the same level of well-being with the project as without it.

Scholarly Works Related to Factors Affecting on Success and Failures of Resettlement Housing Programs

Smith (2001) based on a study conducted in Bingol Province in Turkey identified three factors, crucial in determining the success or failure of a resettlement project: the physical environment of the new settlement, the relationship to the old village and the capability of the community to develop itself. Smith also categorized these factors into four (based on the data from Middle East and Latin America) namely: site, layout, housing and popular input. Further discussing the uneven development performance of resettled villages in Turkey; Smith also suggested that the success or failure of a settlement should be judged by the extent to which the village has become self-reliant in its own right or a viable partner to its original village. They assess this condition on the basis of six factors: the number of houses still occupied; the modification of the form and internal layout of the provided housing; the degree of maintenance and state of repair; the development of gardens, tree planting and enclosures thereof; the extension of buildings and investment in them; and the construction of private buildings.

Takesda *et al* (2008) stated that, resettlement schemes conducted in New Gediz, Turkey were successful due to the reason of "transfer of responsibility from settlement agencies to the

settlers themselves". According to Takesda, in the first place people were attracted to the new city by the provision of services which were not made available at old sites. In the second place, the availability of alternative forms of employment in clerical and service jobs as well as other opportunities in local coal mines and factories enabled displaced rural people to generate new patterns of production in a new environment that was distant from agricultural land. However, poor choices of site for resettlement were identified as one of the most frequently mentioned causes of resettlement failure. In addition, housing design and construction too were often blamed for the rejection or failure of post-disaster resettlement projects and the loss of privacy was another frequent complaint. Accordingly Takesada *et al* (2008), one point for success of resettlement project was the opportunities available for the future generations, particularly the educational opportunities for their children. To this end, those said resettlement programs had included the construction of new schools in the resettlement areas. He also noted that it has been sometimes easier and more feasible to provide the transportation necessary for the children of resettlers to go to existing nearby schools, rather than constructing new ones. As cited by Takeda, the Ikawa Village on the Oi River in central Japan, which was subject to relocation because of dam construction, provided a dormitory for the younger generation in a nearby city as it was impossible to commute to high school from their houses after resettlement. As a result, the village owned a dormitory in the big city, Shizuoka. It was constructed by tax revenues from the dam and power plant, in order to allow their children to stay in the city and go to school. When construction of Keban dam in Turkey, it was interesting to note that the project announced that those affected by the dam construction would be given a chance to go abroad to work. This was one of the tricky points that used to persuade people and would help to success the resettlement project. In essence, a sound resettlement plan should include all families living in the project area, because self-resettlers also need to receive technical, administrative and socio-economic support. This is why counseling services should be provided in the departure area. This point is also very important from the angle of the environmental approach to resettlement, because unplanned self-resettlement carries the risk of environmental destruction in both rural and urban arrival areas (Antinbilek *et al*, 1999).

A review of resettlement projects in Indonesia, during early 2000 following factors were commonly identified as reasons for failure of resettlement projects; lack of adequate baseline information, inadequate resettlement planning, lack of consultation and participation of the affected people, budgetary shortfalls for timely compensation payments, insufficient technical expertise and inadequate institutional capacity, weak monitoring program (Zaman, 2002). However, in Mirpur resettlement project, Bangladesh had been extremely successful in terms of most aspects of the immediate development process in the resettlement estate. The factors that had contributed to its success were; the self-help housing model based on site-and-services scheme that was successful in terms of providing a cost-effective means for providing a more secure and better living environment, location, infrastructure provision and security of tenure; good organizational structure that integrated government agencies, NGOs and the community - This implicitly denotes that the initial registration and allocation of plots was fair and transparent. Sustainable livelihood improvements, with both increased incomes and a major growth in the assets owned by the Baunia residents were also accounted as the factors to be success (Soussan *et al.*, 1999). Takesda 2008, considering the Kotmale Dam Construction induced resettlement project in, Sri Lanka, mentioned that the resettlers of the project had an opportunity to select whether they settle near to the previous location with less land plot or settle in newly develop Mahaweli areas with large land plots. However in Mahaweli area the settlers' income was less stable unlike previous location. But they received

better social and physical infrastructure facilities. However, according to Takesda *et al* (2008), the resettlers settled Mahaweli area recorded more negative results than those who settled closer to the previous locations. Similarly as per the findings of the assessment made on Southern Highway Resettlement, Sri Lanka by Kurruppu *et al* (2005) state that “many displaced persons continued to stay in the same location even if this meant living in cramped”. Therefore these findings imply that the success of resettlement is not only depending on physical and economical improvements but also the social factors which play a significant role.

As per the international advocacy; the World Bank and the ADB experience over the past 10-14 years, major common factors identified that could contribute to the success of resettlement are: political commitment of borrowers in the form of laws, policies, and resources allocations; close adherent to established guidelines and procedures in implementation; sound social analysis, reliable demographic assessments and appropriate technical expertise in planning for development-oriented resettlement; reliable cost estimate and provision of required financing, with resettlement activities phased in tune with civil works construction; effective executing agencies that are responsive to local development needs, opportunities and constraints; people participation in setting resettlement objectives, identifying reestablishment solutions, and implementing them (World Bank 2004, ADB,2009).

Siribopura Resettlement Housing Program

Siribopura Resettlement Housing Program (Figure - 01) was developed to relocate the communities affected by Tsunami in Hambantota city in 2004 and communities displaced due to various development initiatives in Hambantota thereafter. Hambantota Divisional Secretarial (DS) Division was reported as one of highly affected Tsunami areas where almost 30% of the Hambantota old town was washed away with main commercial area. Most of the affected households lived together with more than one family unit and did not have minimum requirements for living. As a result the Siribopura Housing Program was initially implemented to provide permanent residences for the displaced households due to Tsunami. Accordingly in 2005/2006, 1083 households were resettled in this settlement. Subsequently due to construction of phase I of Southern Harbour as a part and partial activity of the Hambantota Development Plan, 454 households were resettled (Source: Urban Development Authority).

Resettlement Procedures: The Urban Development Authority (UDA) was the main responsible agency for the relocation of tsunami affected communities while several other government and non-government organizations gave their assistance accordingly. When considering the Tsunami reconstruction, UDA followed a ‘House to House’ policy and under the House to House rule, previous ownership of land was irrelevant to getting one’s name on list to receive a house i.e. the policy was a house regardless of land tenure. The Divisional Secretary was to select these beneficiaries and resettlers have been chosen based on the criteria that (1) he/ she must be tsunami affected person, (2) property was situated within 100 m from the sea and there is no alternative to live in safely. When there were few families in one home, each family was entitled to receive a separate house. Following above criterion each selected beneficiary family received a built up house¹ with a 20 perch land.

¹ Houses were donated by several NGOs and CBOs namely Suchi Foundation, Sajith Foundation, Singapore Red Cross, Suboda Foundation, Care International etc.

Figure 01 – Case Study Area



Source: Compiled by Author

With regard to harbour development induced resettlement implemented in 2007/2008 the Ports Authority was the executing agency in expropriating the displaced households while other line agencies provided the necessary services as required. Unlike Tsunami housing, all resettlers from harbor development received a 20 perches land with proportionate compensation for the loss of their original place. Accordingly the resettlers had constructed their own houses based on their own layouts and designs. The payment of the compensation was carried out according to a special cabinet approval², and as a result the owners could receive compensation over and above the market value of their properties (according to the interviews with resource persons of the Ports Authority and focus group discussions with resettlers, 2011). Also the unauthorized settlers of the original location too were able to receive compensation for the loss of their house. Accordingly the minimum compensation payment for a house was Rs 500,000, where some families could receive figures up to Rs 2,000,000 (interview with the Ports Authority, 2011). Further if the owner vacated the land to the Authority without any delay the Authority had paid an extra 10% compensation in order to motivate the owners to physically vacate the lands for the project. In addition for those who originally were in the possession of more than one acre of agricultural lands received an agricultural land of 40 perches within 1Km proximity to Siribopura resettlement site.

Study Methods: As implied earlier the aim of this study is to evaluate the Siribopura Resettlement Housing Program in terms of factors affected to the success and failures of the project. For the said purpose several variables that causes success or failures of resettlement were identified (Table 01) based on previous scholarly works (Sec 3) and interviews with

² Generally the compensation for resettlers will be paid under Land Acquisition Act No 09 of 1950

several Sri Lankan expertise³ who have considerable experience with regard to resettlement housing programs. Accordingly, before and after situation of resettlers were considered by data collected through questionnaire survey with 120 families of Siribopura Housing Program, including 100 families from Tsunami resettlement program and 20 families from Southern Harbor Development –Phase I, Resettlement Program. Table 02 describes the mean values derived based on the resettlers responses for the level of satisfaction, with regard to real estate, economical and social aspects using the above questionnaire survey. In addition, Table 03 has further summarized the existing situation of the facilities provided for the above resettlers in the selected sites. These data has been analysed descriptively together with the empirical evidences made through the reconnaissance survey in the project sites.

Table 01 – Variables⁴ used to ascertain the success and failures of the Resettlement Program

Main Criterion	Variables used to measure the criterion
Improvement of physical environment of the resettlement (Real Estate aspects)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Choice of site for resettlement • Provision of services to the new location • Layout of the property • Housing design, construction and privacy • Common property resources and community/ public services provided to affected persons.
Full economic rehabilitation of the affected persons (Economic Aspects)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New pattern of employment opportunities and motivation for other financial gain opportunities • Facilities to upgrade their present livelihood • Opportunities for future generation • Access to credit facilities • The capability of the community to develop itself
Full social rehabilitation of the affected person (Social Aspects)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social status and relationships • Commitment for family • Education opportunities and facilities for younger generation • Facilitating for religion practices • Political empowerment • Crime rate in the area • Counseling services provided

Source: Compiled by Authors, 2011

Results of the Research

Snapshot of the respondents: 75.8% of the respondents of the questionnaire survey were Sinhala Buddhists while the next highest (21.7%) were Muslims, similar to the total population composition of the settlement. The average household size in the settlement was around 4.4 and 15% of families responded were female headed. 50.8% of families of the sample fall to an income (monthly) range between Rs 10,000 to Rs 25,000, where prior to resettlement it has been 39.2%. 40.8% of them fall between an income ranges of Rs1500 – 10000 after resettlement. Prior to the resettlement this amounted to 48.3%. However the percentage of households that earn more than Rs 25,000 monthly has been dropped from

³ Experts in agencies such as Disaster Mitigation Center, Urban Development Authority, Ports Authority, Divisional Secretariat Office and the Local Authority

⁴ These variables are measured through a questionnaire measured in liquored scale which scaled as 5= strongly satisfied, 4 = satisfied, 3 = neutral, 2= disagree, 1= strongly disagree

12.5% to 8.3% (Primary Survey, 2011). Hence it shows that in general these households are falling in the category of poor to lower middle income group where significant improvement in income level after the resettlement has been marginal.

Real Estate Aspects: When real estate aspects are considered, it shows that the level of satisfaction among the resettlers for the design and construction of resettled houses, physical infrastructure and other common services provided to the sites have been favorable for harbor resettlement with a mean value of 4.0 to 4.3. However the results for the Tsunami housing have been comparatively less favorable with a mean value of 3.4 and 2.3 respectively. As evident in Table 03 (criteria 01 and 02) on average more than 80% of the households receive the required essential physical and social infrastructure within 1-8 km proximity. However the reason for lower satisfaction with respect to the services for Tsunami housing was that there were certain Tsunami resettled houses that did not even have electricity yet. With respect to design and construction, the resettlers of harbor development project been receiving the financial compensation in order to build the house according to their wish and therefore the level of satisfaction for the design and construction of harbor resettlers houses were higher as 80% (mean value =4.0). Further all most all the houses both Tsunami and harbor were built in modern to semi modern state with permanent materials where some of the harbor resettled houses were even being two storey (Table 03: Criteria 04). Hence on average the factors such as design and construction of houses and the services provided to the sites have been successful in the Siribopura resettlement from resettlers' point of view.

When considering the factors such as site selection and layout and the improvement to the land tenure after resettlement are concerned, the level of success in terms of mean value, records 1.7 and 2.4 for Tsunami resettlement and 2.3 and 3.3 for the Southern Harbor resettlement respectively. Overall these factors record a mean value of 2.9 and 2.0 respectively. Many households were dissatisfied with the location due to comparatively higher distance to the town area than previous location. Especially those were engaged in fishing and farming in Hambantota coastal line, now have to travel to the sea shore by bus or on foot for about 3.5km. Further in the case of Tsunami housing many households did not like the layout of the house with a kitchen in front. Many of them have made amendments to the initial layouts in reconstructing their kitchen and the toilet according to their wish. Also majority of the households only possess a verbal or written agreement (merely a letter from the donor) to prove their ownership to the respective property where the title to the property has not yet been formalized except in 196 out of 453 harbor resettled properties being receiving deeds.

Table 02 – Level of satisfaction of the households with regard to the physical, economical and social improvements they received after resettlement

Main Criterion	Variables used to measure the criterion	Sub Mean values			Total mean value		
		Tsunami	Harbor	Overall	Tsunami	Harbor	Overall
Improvement of physical environment of the resettlement	Site selection and Layout of the property	1.7	2.3	2.0	2.7	3.5	3.1
	Improvement of land tenure	2.4	3.3	2.9			
	Provision of services to the new location	2.3	4.3	3.3			
	Housing design, construction and privacy	3.4	4.0	3.7			
	Common property resources and community/ public services	3.3	3.4	3.4			
Full economic rehabilitation of the affected persons	Facilities to upgrade their present livelihood	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.8	2.8	2.8
	New pattern of employment opportunities, and motivation for other financial gain opportunities	2.9	3.0	2.9			
	Opportunities for future	3.2	3.2	3.2			
	Access to credit facilities	3.0	3.1	3.1			
	The capability of the community to develop itself	2.8	2.9	2.9			
Full social rehabilitation of the affected person	Social status and relationships	3.1	4	3.6	2.5	2.9	2.7
	Avenues and time for family commitments	2.8	3.1	2.9			
	Educational opportunities and facilities	3.0	3.0	3.0			
	Facilities for religion practices	2.8	3.2	2.9			
	Political empowerment	2.6	2.8	2.8			
	Crime rate in the area	2.9	3.0	2.9			
	Counseling services provided in the departure area	0.1	0.9	0.5			

Source: Primary Survey, 2011

Table – 03 - Situational Analysis on Resettlements

	Criteria	Sub criteria	Before Resettlement		After resettlement	
			Tsunami	Harbor	Tsunami	Harbor
01	Provision of services to the new location	• Availability of Physical infrastructure (Electricity, water supply, telecommunication ...etc)	76%	83%	74%	84%
		• Availability of Social infrastructure (Schools, hospitals, administrative matters, play grounds etc.)	85%	100%	86%	100%
		• Average distance to schools	1.2km	1.9km	1.8km	8.4km
		• Average distance to hospital	2.4km	2.6km	5.3km	2.8km
02	Common property resources and community/ public services provided to affected persons	• Availability of Community Centers	77%	80%	51%	37%
		• Parks & Play ground	64%	60%	37%	50%
		• Average distance to admin matters	2.7km	2.5km	1km	0.5km
		• Percentage of respondents satisfied with the agency relationship in resettlement	N/A	N/A	79%	60%
03	Improvement of land tenure	• Type of Tenure		Only 196 received deeds and others to be entitled for Government grants and Permits		
		1. Encroached	32%			30%
		2. Freehold	5%			0%
		3. Government Grant	56%	70%		
		• Proof of ownership				
		1. Registered deed	43%	17%	4%	47%
		2. Unregistered deed	09%	10%	-	-
		3. Verbal and written agreement	6%	13%	92%	53%
		4. No idea	34%	17%	4%	-
		• Planning approval	0%	0%	0%	0%

04	Housing design, construction and privacy	• No of Stories					
		1. One Store	94%	100%	100%	75%	
		2. Two Store	4%	-	-	25%	
		3. More than two store	2%	-	-	-	
		• Design					
		1. Modern	19%	30%	12%	50%	
		2. Semi Modern	69%	63%	88%	47%	
		3. Old	12%	07%		03%	
		• Houses Constructed using permanent materials	82%	93%	100%	100%	
		• Level of completion of house	N/A	N/A	Built up houses were donate		
				FO ⁵	7		
				PC ⁶	30		
				FC ⁷	63		
05	New pattern of employment opportunities and motivation for other financial gain opportunities	• Major occupation (s) of resettlers					
		1. Fishing	06	13	16	4	
		2. Farming	17	07	13	1	
		3. Self occupation	30	57	31	12	
		4. Executive and staff level jobs	77	63	73	20	

⁵ Foundation Only

⁶ Partly completed

⁷ Fully complete

		• Activities attached to the land other than housing	Fishing & Small industry (SM)	Farming & SM	SM and businesses (BS) are engaged by limited no of settlers	SM and BS are engaged by limited no of settlers
06	Access to credit facilities	• Number of households who had accessed to credit facilities	15	20	26	46
		•				
		•		Credit	Credit	Credit
		•				
		•				
		• Availability of collateral	0%	0%	0%	0%
		• Eligible to receive assessment numbers from the local authority	0%	0%	0%	0%
07	The capability of the community to develop itself	• Services received from the local authority (Average respondents received the services such as garbage collection, drainage construction & maintenance, road construction and maintenance, street lighting etc)	55%	4%	Limited Services are provided	Services are provided relatively higher than the tsunami housing
		• Households who made new investment on land	N/A	N/A	46%	39%

08	land market value (RS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formal market 	N/A	N/A	Not yet eligible	No evidence of transaction
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Informal market 	N/A	N/A	Initially 200000 - 300000 to 1.500,000 to 1900,000 at present ⁸	

Source: Primary Survey, 2011

⁸ These market evidences were obtained through focus group discussions with resettlers

This includes the fact that none of these households have been eligible to apply for the planning approvals and the assessment numbers for their property and as a result these properties do not formally come under the preview of the respective local authority (Table 03 – criteria 03). Further consequences of it is that the majority of the housing transactions have been carried out in the informal markets, which indicates that resettlers would not be able to realize the full capital value of the property (Table 03 – criteria 08). (Note: A comparison of land values in the informal and the formal market was not possible in absence of private lands in the surrounding area).

Economic Aspects: When economic factors are considered Table 02 indicates that new pattern of employment opportunities and the motivation for other financial gains, opportunities for future generation and access to credit facilities have been successful in the eyes of the resettlers with a mean value greater than 3 (except the first factor which is slightly below 3.0 in tsunami housing). Analyzing these factors with Table 03 (criteria 05) shows that more than 75% of the resettlers were engaged in self employment activities and executive to staff level jobs which are new pattern of employment where the conventional livelihoods of Hambantota area being fishing, farming /agriculture. Only less than 25 % of the resettlers were engaged in fishing and farming activities. The main reason behind this change would have been the practical difficulties they have to face to continue their traditional livelihood activities and the declaration of Hambantota to be develop as a mega city and the development activities flourished to the surrounding area accordingly, including Southern Harbor, New Administrative Complex etc. where people have the motivation to hope for new aspirations of their lives in future irrespective of what they receive at present. Especially the harbor resettlers believe that they may get the priority for job opportunities in future in Southern Harbor. Further as the table 03 (Criteria 06) shows, a considerable number of households whom were in need of credit were able access for loan facilities through micro loan programs irrespective of the absence for collateral.

However the income generating activities attached to the land (investment on land other than housing) has been dropped from 2.1 to 1.7 in Tsunami and Southern Harbor Resettlement when compared with the situation of before resettlement which was increased from 1.8 to 2.0. This was mainly due to the fact that the change of livelihood pattern and the lack of space available for homestead activities than previous. Moreover 30% of the Tsunami houses are being unoccupied (reconnaissance survey, 2011) even though those properties are being allocated for beneficiaries. Prior to 2009 this unoccupancy ratio has been around 50% (focus group discussion, 2011). Even though this unoccupancy ratio has come down, yet there is a considerable number of houses which are being unoccupied. In addition almost all the commercial properties inside the settlement are not functioning and are being closed and deteriorating. These circumstances, all together with the lack of formal rights to the land as mentioned earlier had lead to the negative results for the community's ability to develop by themselves as shown in Table 2. (2.8 for Tsunami Resettlement and 2.9 for Southern Harbor Resettlement respectively). This means that still the community expects the dependency of the resettlement agency for their survival rather facing the contingencies by themselves.

Success and failures in Social Aspects: In terms of social factors improvement of social status, educational opportunities and facilities have been successful with mean values recording higher than 3, where avenues and time for family commitment, facilities for religion practices, political empowerment and the reduction of crime rate in the area have been in the margin of neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (Table 02). Out of five (05) sites

allocated (in Tsunami housing) for Buddhist temples, four (04) Buddhist temples have been abandoned without clergies, as some of them are mere housing plots built for residences rather than specifically designed for temples. Hence the participation for rituals and ceremonial events of laymen's by clergies has been not seen often. However the temples build for harbor resettlement have been functioning relatively successful. Further Islamic mosques are comparatively well built with the participation of the Islamic community, where people are actively practicing their religious customs (Reconnaissance survey/focus group discussion, 2011). With respect to counseling services provided for the resettlers in order to uplift their mentality and guide them to rehabilitate themselves physically, economically and socially to the new environment, shows rather negative results (mean value =0.5). Some of the women in Tsunami houses show signs of fatigue and depression when their views are expressed. Moreover many of the resettlers were strongly dissatisfied with regard to such guidance provided by the resettling agencies irrespective of compensation and facilities provided to them. As per the focus group discussions held with selected resettlers (2011) during the field survey it was revealed that during the resettlement process, no program was conducted to upgrade the mentality of the resettlers, especially for Tsunami resettlers where they still struggle to restore their social life (for instance, some are having their second marriages and 15% of the samples were widows) after loss of their family members. On the other hand with respect to resettlers of Southern Harbor a considerable number of households had lost their money received through payment of compensation due to lack of knowledge in managing such finance thereby investing their money with the non reliable financial investments⁹. In addition some of the households had not managed their financial compensation to restore their house to a livable stage. These factors are symptomised in Table 04 (criteria 4), where only 63 % have completed their housing construction and 7% of them had completed only up to the level of foundation and 30 % of them had partly completed their houses. With respect to crime rates the focus group discussions also revealed that some of the idling properties have been using for illegal activities such as prostitution and drug dealing (ganja) and if increased would have a serious social implication to the entire settlement. Further this resettlement locates in a place where there is no host community physically so that at a glance these settlements looks isolate from rest of the area until proposed developments to the surrounding area come up.

Overall Satisfaction: The overall satisfaction of the Siribopura Tsunami Resettlement Program in terms of real estate, economic and social aspects shows a mean value of 2.6 showing a success rate of about 50%. Among this rate of success economic aspects records the higher mean value of 2.8 in comparison with 2.7 for real estate and 2.5 for social aspects. However, comparatively the Siribopura Southern Harbor Resettlement Program (which was implemented 2-3 years after the Tsunami resettlement) shows a success rate of about 62% (overall mean value 3.06). The reason for this difference has been mainly arrived through satisfaction of the resettlers with respect to real estate aspects (total mean value of 3.5) while having a same level of satisfaction as Tsunami housing for economic aspects. However in both projects social factors records the lowest level of satisfaction with a mean value of 2.5 and 2.9 for Tsunami and Harbour Resettlement Projects respectively.

⁹ Investing money with "Dhaduwam Mudalali" (Nick name of a man who established an illegal financial firm in Sri Lanka), who had been later accused for making fraudulent financial investments through public deposits

Concluding Remarks: The Lessons Learned

It is a fact that resettlers are satisfied with their situation only if they are not merely displaced but rather resettled with development. Hence in strict sense of “resettlement” resettlers should be better off than before resettlement and should be sustainable overtime. When the outcomes of the Siribopura Resettlement Projects are concerned firstly it is envisaged that more the autonomy and resettlers participation in designing and arranging the layout of their houses are given, higher the rate of satisfaction would be, owing to the fact that within Sri Lankan context house is more a socio cultural estate than just a dwelling. Site selection naturally becomes a factor which unfolds dissatisfied for resettlers owing to the socio cultural relationship that the resettlers had with their previous location. This seems to be the case for almost all resettlement projects both locally and internationally. Moreover reinstate them fully to their previous socio cultural status may not be feasible, but what can be done in this regard is to facilitate them to adapt to the new environment with passage of time. For instance it was shown that Siribopura resettlers have adopted themselves to new type of jobs from their traditional livelihoods.

Another aspect investigated was, whether the resettlement has reduced the existing poverty of resettlers. As per the findings of the study the income level of resettlers increased marginally and even one could argue that such increment is negligible when the time value of money since resettlement is concerned. One major corner stone that can be generally agree to cause this issue was the absence of formal title to the land to gain the optimal value and utilization thereby to invest on it with certainty. On the other hand explicitly it was shown that the absence of a suitable atmosphere to continue and improve their additional sources of income.

Further providing appropriate counseling for resettlers is emphasized for the resettlement executing agencies, where this paper adequately pointed out how the absence of counseling for resettlers could agitate the said issues both short term and long run in the resettlement. As a matter of fact, in counseling the resettlers of the disaster induced and development induced should be treated separately. For instance the cause of the mental destruction of two groups of resettlers may vary; as there can be a startling difference where the Tsunami resettlers are more of a situation of a “dilemma” and harbor resettlers more feel like the losers of the development projects.

Moreover the study clearly surfaces that the crucial socio-cultural aspects or values are insufficiently linked to the economic and real estate aspects which is fundament to the real sense and to the sustainability of the resettlement. Reinstating a damaged community is not merely limited to reconstruction of serviced houses and provide them a job. Hence the need for a consistent conceptual approach to social impacts should be emphasized. If not the shortfall in one aspect generates negative consequences in multiple effects making the resettlement unsuccessful.

In addition the absence of formal land rights and withholding and abandonment of properties (both residential and commercial being idling) have generated market failures. This in turn had been a barrier for respective local authorities to intervene formally with respect to land management of these properties. This includes that the community might envisage to weak political empowerment and institutional capacity hindering their capability to offset their risk, absorb shocks and meet contingencies, thereby causing inability for the community to develop by themselves.

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